Adwa: treaty language, defended sovereignty and political memory

In March 1896, Ethiopian forces defeated an invading Italian army at Adwa. The conflict involved a prior diplomatic dispute: Italy claimed a protectorate relationship through Article XVII of the 1889 Wichalē treaty, while Menelik II rejected that claim. The episode connects military resistance with a question about international authority—whether another government could control Ethiopia’s external relations. Its later representation also became part of a wider African political memory. ^[2][5][7]

Historian Sven Rubenson’s 1964 published extract identifies a consequential difference between the treaty’s Italian and Amharic versions. He argues that the Italian wording turned an offer to carry diplomatic communications into an obligation to conduct external affairs through Italian channels. The Amharic text lacked that obligation. The problem concerns the relationship created by a clause, the two texts’ authority and the political action taken in their name. ^[2]

Rubenson’s interpretation treats Menelik’s refusal as central to the record. It also challenges an inherited description of Ethiopia as an Italian protectorate between 1889 and 1896. That description would accept the claimed relationship as an accomplished legal fact. His argument asks readers to examine the textual basis of the claim before using it to classify the country’s status. The distinction makes Ethiopian diplomatic refusal visible within the history of the conflict. ^[2]

In a 1965 response, Carlo Giglio located responsibility differently. His published extract argues that negotiator Pietro Antonelli and Menelik agreed on an optional channel for communications, recorded correctly in Amharic but left differently worded in Italian. Giglio attributed the decisive manoeuvre to Italian premier Francesco Crispi’s notification of the article to other powers. This interpretation gave diplomatic notification and its acknowledgement a role in creating the claimed protectorate relationship. ^[3]

Rubenson replied in 1966 that notification could not establish the relationship if the underlying clause lacked validity. He also argued that Italy never gained actual control over Ethiopia’s external relations or internal affairs. The exchange identifies separate questions: the wording a negotiator produced, the claim a government communicated, recognition by other states and effective control. These are connected dimensions of international power, each requiring evidence. The disagreement should remain visible when the episode is taught. ^[4]

The University of Washington’s presentation of Raymond Jonas’s 2011 historical study situates Adwa across Africa, Europe and the Americas. It identifies the organised Ethiopian army, Menelik’s political consolidation, Taytu and diplomatic advisers within its account. Such an approach places the victory in networks of leadership, military preparation and communication. Ethiopian actors worked through those relationships to defend independence in a period of expanding European conquest. ^[5]

That presentation also stresses the significance which people in the African diaspora attached to an independent Ethiopia. Adwa challenged the expectation that European domination would eventually encompass the continent. Its wider political life developed through the circulation of a victory and its interpretation among people living in other racial and imperial settings. The transnational argument in Jonas’s study makes that circulation an important part of the history, alongside the battlefield result. ^[5]

The accompanying archival detail comes from an 1890 chromolithograph after Pio Joris, depicting Menelik’s 1889 coronation. Library of Congress specialist Fentahun Tiruneh identifies religious leaders, princes and officials in the imagery. Their arrangement presents monarchy through church and political office. The print predates Adwa and records a representation of authority in that earlier setting. ^[1]

Tiruneh also describes Empress Taytu’s concern about Italian negotiations and her strategic role in controlling access to water during the campaign. Her participation places diplomatic judgement and practical military decisions within an account often centred on the emperor. The identified commentary provides the evidential basis for including those roles in the political history readers encounter. ^[1]

The Smithsonian’s record for Solomon Belachew’s Battle of Adwa dates the painting to 1970. It describes Ethiopian and Italian forces, inscriptions and the appearance of St George above the battlefield. The museum explicitly notes artistic licence in the flags, the rulers represented and the arrangement of figures. Those details locate the painting within the making of historical memory. The canvas is evidence of how a later Ethiopian artist composed the victory for an audience. ^[6]

Its date also changes the questions a viewer can answer from it. The positioning of figures can communicate remembered authority, religious significance and collective pride. Establishing a particular troop formation or participant requires other records. The museum’s identification of artistic licence helps readers keep the painting’s interpretive work in view. Studying such a work combines visual attention with an account of the circumstances in which the image was produced. ^[6]

On 2 March 2026, the African Union Commission’s chairperson commemorated Adwa through the language of sovereignty, dignity and unity, linking its inspiration to Agenda 2063. This is a dated institutional use of the past. It shows how the victory is invoked to support continental solidarity and self-determination. The statement’s political purpose belongs to the history of commemoration; it supplies evidence about the AU’s contemporary framing of Adwa. ^[7]